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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--NON-LIABILITY FOR WRONGFUL
OR NEGLIGENT ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS,
ACTING IN A PUBLIC OR GOVERNMENTAL CAPAcITY.-A very

important question it seems, for the consideration of lawyers
and for future law makers, is the question of liability or nonliability of a municipality for wrongs and injuries caused
by the wrongful or negligent acts or omissions of officers
or agents of the town or city, while such officers or agents
are engaged in a so called governmental function. From
a review of the cases on this. question, it would seem that
the law is fairly well settled on the point in this, and in
most of our states, but whether it is settled correctly and
as it should be is quite another question. It is the purpose
of this articles to attempt to show that the law on the question as apparently settled in this state, is not always satisfactory in its application to the cases, that it calls for
arbitrary decisions from the courts as to just what is a
goveftniental and what a private or proprietary function,
that possibly it is wrong, or at least should be open to
careful consideration by our courts and legislature.
The rule of law as generally applied is that, in the
absence of statute,, a muncipality is not liable for injuries
received through the negligence or wrongful acts of its
officers while acting in the capacity of governmental agents,
while engaged in a governmental function.1 But, a town
or city is liable for the injuries caused by the wrongful act
or negligence of its officers while engaged in the exercise of
so-called private or proprietary function. 2 Such it seems is
the general rule followed in this state and in almost all the
states of this country. The question then is, what is a
governmental act or function, and what a so called private
or proprietary act or function, and when is an officer acting
in a governmental capacity and when in a private capacity?
Is there any real distinction between the governmental
acts on the one hand, and the private acts on the other,
such as will justify the application of two different rules
Brown's Adm'r. v. Town of Guyandotte, 84 W. Va. 299, 12 S. E. 707 (1890)
Gibson v. City of Huntington, 38 W. Va. 177, 18 S. E. 447 (1893) ; Bentlett v. Town
of Clarksburg, 45 W. Va. 893, 31 S. E. 918 (1898) ; Shaw v. City of Charleston, 57 W.
Va. 433, 50 S. E. 527 (1905) ; Mendel and Company v. City of Wheeling, 28 W. Va. 238
(1886) ; Ritz v. City of Wheeling 45 W. Va. 262, 31 S. E. 998 (1898) ; Carder v. City
of Clarksburg, 131 S. E. 349 (W. Va. 1926).
Haley v. City of Boston, 191 Mass. 291, 77 N. E. 888 (1906) ; Tomlin v. Hildreth,
65 N. J. L. 348, 47 At. 649 (1900) ; Fisher v. City of Newbern, 140 N. C. 6, 58 S. E.
342 (190); Wigal's Adninistratrix a. City of Parkeraburg, 74 W. Va. 25, 81 S. 1. 554
(1914).
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of law? It is submitted that there is no real distinction
between the so called governmental and the private acts of
the city officers, and it is believed that a shiort review of
some of the cases will serve to show how arbitrary the
courts have been in deciding whether an act of a city
officer is governmental or private, and into what confusion
the courts have been thrown in an attempt to draw the
distinction and apply the law, for the difficulty in applying
the doctrine of liability or no liability, is in determining
whether the function performed was of a governmental
or a private nature."
In a West Virginia case, a small son of the plaintiff had
been injured and died because of having been confined in
a filthy and unsanitary city jail, and because of negligent
and inhuman treatment which he received from officers of
the city, while so confined. In an action by his father
against the city, the court held the city not liable, on the
sole ground that the city officers in imprisoning the boy,
were acting in a governmental capacity.4 The court there
admits that a grievous wrong had been done the plaintiff,
and that his little son had suffered barbarous and inhuman
treatment at the hands of the city officers, but it says that
the hardship of the case cannot be permitted to overthrow
fundamental principles of law. 5
In another case, Mendel and Company lost a factory
building by fire in the city of Wheeling. The city owned
and operated its waterworks for the purposes of fire protection, and received water rents from those supplied with
water. Mendel and Company were supplied with water
and paid the charge. The property was destroyed because
the supply pipes, through the negligence of the city, were
suffered to become clogged with mud so that they would
not supply any water. In a suit by Mendel and Company
against the city, the court held the city not liable for damages for the loss, because it was acting in a governmental
capacity in supplying the water.6
In'still another very recent case, the city of Clarksburg
owned and operated a motor tractor used for work in the
construction of its streets. The agents of the. city negli34 Carder
v. City of
Shaw v. City of

Clarksburg, 131 S. E. 349, at 350 (W. Va., 1926).
Charleston, 57 W. Va. 433, 50 S. E. 527 (1905).
opinion by Mr. Justice Poffenbarger.
a Mendel and Company v. City of Nhteeling, 28 W. Va. 233 (1896).
5 Shaw v. City of Charleston, supra, n. 4,
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gently left this tractor parked on a certain street, in a
populous part of the town, and on an incline, unlocked
and unguarded. The plaintiff's intestate, a small boy,
while playing in the street, climbed on the tractor, it ran
down the incline with him, threw him off and killed him.
In a suit against the city, the court held no liability on the
ground that the tractor was so parked by the agents of the
city in the exercise of a governmental function, and that
being true, the city was not liable for the negligence of its
officers. The court also refused to allow liability on the
theory that the street was out of repair, under the West
Virginia statute,7 though the court says that if the tractor
had run down the incline of its own weight, and the plaintiff's intestate had been injured by it, that the city would
then have been liable under that statute."
Such then are some of the decisions that excuse a municipality from liability for the results of its negligence or
wrong, because the city was acting in the so called governmental capacity. What is the justification for such decisions? Why should a city or town be excused for wantonly or negligently causing the death of a small boy, or
the destruction of a citizen's property, when an individual
would not be excused under the same circumstances, merely
on the theory that it is acting in a governmental capacity?
Now in looking to the decisions where liability is imposed
on a city on the ground that it is acting in a private capacity, the confusion of the courts as to just what is private
and what governmental will become apparent.
In a case, the city of Parkersburg was held liable for
the death of the plaintiff's intestate caused by the bursting
of a water tank which the city maintained for the purpose of
supplying its citizens with water for domestic use. 9 Therefore, a city supplying water for domestic use is acting in a
private capacity and so liable, while a city supplying water
for the purposes of fire protection is acting in a governmental capacity, and so not liable for its negligence, according to the decisions.
In the following cases municipalities have been held
liable for acts of negligence.
I W. VA. CODE1928, c. 48, §167.
0 Carder v. City of CIarksburg, supra n. 3.
9 Wigal's Administratrix v. City of Parkersburg, aupra n. 2.
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For injury to property by escaping smoke from a pumping station. 10 For placing a hydrant in the curb of a
sidewalk so close that the wheel of a carriage, in passing,
struck it."
For negligently permitting its supply of water in its
waterworks system to become polluted, so that the plaintiff's intestate contracted typhoid fever and died from
2
using the water.
For negligently laying mains and pipes under and across
a public highway.13 These have all been held to be private or proprietary acts of the city, for the negligent performance of which the city is liable just as an individual
would be. Also, cleaning the streets,14 constructing sew7
ers, 6 maintaining a city prison,' or driving an ash cart,'
have been held to be private or corporate acts, and so the
city liable for their negligent doing, whereas, the building
and operation of a drawbridge,' the maintenance of a
city hall and other municipal buildings, 19 driving an ambulanee, 20 and maintaining a city hospital 2 ' have been held
to be governmental acts, excusing the city from any liability for injuries caused by their negligent performance.
Such seems at best, an unconvincing distinction. From
this review of decisions in cases that have arisen, it becomes apparent that there is no uniformity among the
courts as to just what is a governmental, and what a private act of the city. While the rule of law seems fairly
well settled, it is seen that it is very difficult of application,
and that each court must arbitrarily decide for itself, what
is a governmental and what a private act. It is submitted
that there is no real distinction between the two kinds of
cases, and that the law, as it is, in its attempted application, works too many hardships and ought to be otherwise.
After all, why should a town or city not respond in damages
just as an individual, when by its wrongful or negligent act,
Gordon v. Silver Creek, 127 N. Y. App. Div. 888 (1886).
" St. Germaine v. City of Fall River. 177 Mass. 550. 59 N. E. 447 (1901).
" Keever v.
City of Mankato, 113 Minn. 55, 129 N. W. 775 (1911).
' City Council of AugUsta v. Maekey, 118 Ga. 64, 38 S. E. 339 (1900).
1 Young v. Metropolitan Street Railway
Company, 126 Mo. App. 1, 103 S. W. 185
(1907).
' Ely v. St. Louis, 181 Mo. 723, 81 S. W. 168 (1904).
11 Edwards v. Town of Pocahontas, 47 Fed. 268 (1891).
17 Missano v. Mayor of New York, 160 N. Y. 123, 54 N. E. 744 (1899).
18Daly v. New Haven, 69 Conn. 644, 88 AtI. 897 (1906).
11Schwalk's Adm'r. v. Louisville, 135 Ky. 570, 122 S. W. 860 (1909).
0 Maximillian v. Mayor of New York, 62 N. Y. 160 (1875).
21 Tollefson v. Ottawa, 228 Ill.
184, 81 N. E. 823 (1907).
10
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it causes death or injury to an individual? Is it more important to excuse cities from liability for their admitted
'negligence, than it is to compensate private citizens for
their wrongful injury? Will such a rule as is applied in
this state today, have a tendency to make towns and cities
more or less careful of the interests of private citizens?
Clearly there can be but one answer to that question.
It has been held that a city is liable to an individual for
nmgligent or wrongful governmental acts, if such acts
amount to a taking of the individual's property. 22 Therefore, according to the decisions, a man's property is of
more importance than his life.
That a few of the courts have dared to fly in the face of
the doctrine and hold the city liable regardless of the
question of whether it caused the injury in the doing of a
governmental or a private act, will be seen from a careful
review of the cases. In the state of Ohio, a city was held
liable for damages to one who was injured by a negligently
driven fire engine, returning from a fire.2
Clearly the
city there was acting governmentally, as defined by the
courts, and yet the court imposed liability. The strongest
dissenting state, however, from the general rule as here
discussed, seems to be that of New York, where apparently
the courts hold municipalities liable for their negligence in
all cases, regardless of the question of the governmental
or private nature of the act. 24 Cases from that state show
that in all cases of injuries resulting from defective condifion of school buildings, or from negligence of the persons
in charge thereof, New York imposes liability on the city
or on the board of education, though the usual rule is to
exempt from liability, as education is purely a governmental function. So we may say that the state of New
York, though she stands almost alone in this respect, refuses
to draw the artificial distinction between the so called
governmental and private acts, but imposes liability on
the town or city just as it would on an individual, for
2 Jordon v. City of Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312. 26 S. E. 266 (1896) ; Ashley W, City
of Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296, 24 Am. Reo. 652 (1877).
2 Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Oh. St. 158, 126 'N. E. 72 (1919).
"' Wahrman v. Board of Education, 187 N. Y. 331, 80 N. E. 192 (1907) ; Tltusville
Iron Company v. City of New York, 207 N. Y. 203, 100 N. E. 806 (1912) ; Kelly v,
Board of Education, 191 App. Div. 261, 180 N. Y. S. q96 (1920); Van Dyke v. City
of Utica, 203 App. Div. 26, 196 N. Y. S. 277 (1922); Herman v. Board of Educa.
tion, 234 N. Y. 196, 137 N. E. 34 (1920) ; Williams v. Board of Trustees, 204 App. Div.
566, 198 N. Y. S. p. 476 (1923) ; 34 YALE L. J. 129, and cases there cited.
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injuries resulting from its wrongful or negligent act. It
is suggested that New York is perhaps right in this, and
that the courts of our own and other states would do well
to follow her lead.
-J. H. W.
VENDOR

AND

PURCHASER-COMPLETE

PURCHASER-DOC-

TRINE OF.-In a recent case, the plaintiff, as owner of
the oil and gas under a seventy-five acre tract, seeks
by a bill in equity to perpetually enjoin the defendant, lessee of the board of education, from drilling a well,
and to cancel, as a cloud upon plaintiff's title, the lease
from the board of education to the defendant. The only
issue of fact is whether the plaintiff is a complete purchaser
of the oil and gas rights in the tract without notice of the
rights of the defendant under an unrecorded deed to the
board of education from a common grantor. Held, that
to be protected by Section 5, Chapter 74 of the Code,
against a prior unrecorded deed, one must be a complete
purchaser for value, must have had no notice of the prior
contract or deed, and must have paid all the purchase
money for the land purchased by him. United Fuel Gas
Co. v. Morley Oil and Gas Co., 131 S. E. 716 (W. Va.
1926).
In laying down the above rule the Supreme Court has
followed the common law doctrine of "complete purchaser",
whereby one, though he had paid part of the consideration,
if he received notice of a prior claim before completing
the payment (or even after paying the whole, if he received
notice before obtaining his conveyance), would lose all his
claim upon the land. Tourville v. Naish, 3 P. Wins. 307;
Wigg v. Wigg, 1 Atk. 384; Story v. Lord Windsor, 2 Atk.
630; Beverley v. Brooke, 2 Leigh 446. This common rule
has been uniformly followed in West Virginia by recent
decisions and perhaps by all the decisions in this state on
the point with the exception of one case. Mitchell and
Romine v. Dawson, 23 W. Va. 86. In that case however,
the court held that C although he received notice of B's
equitable lien before paying all the purchase price, took
the land from A discharged from B's lien except as to that
part of the purchase money still due from C to A at th6
time he received notice of B's lien. The Supreme Court
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